---
title: "Why international education never built its GDS: the missing settlement layer"
description: "Aviation built a shared system to pay travel agents in 1971. International education built course-search platforms and skipped the money. The layer no one builds."
date: "2026-06-17"
updated: "2026-07-10"
category: "Business strategy"
keywords: "Business strategy"
author: "Raphael Arias"
cover: "/images/blog/blog-why-international-education-has-no-gds-settlement-layer.jpg"
lang: "en"
wordCount: 4884
url: https://qualyhq.com/blog/why-international-education-has-no-gds-settlement-layer
---
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# Why international education never built its GDS: the missing settlement layer

> Aviation built a shared system to pay travel agents in 1971. International education built course-search platforms and skipped the money. The layer no one builds.

Aviation built a shared clearinghouse — one system that collects from every travel agent and pays every airline — back in 1971, and it now moves over $240 billion a year between 400+ airlines and 59,000 agents almost flawlessly. International education, fifty years later, has nothing like it: 40% of agents still chase and reconcile their commission by hand. The industry built the course-booking layer twice over and skipped the part that moves the money. That missing money layer — not a better CRM — is the real gap.

I founded a software company for education agents. It was called EducationLink, I sold it to Edvisor in 2020, and in the years I spent building it I watched the international education industry try, repeatedly, to build the thing that travel built in 1971 — and fail every time. Not because the people were dumb. Because the thing is genuinely hard, and because every attempt mistook the easy half of the problem for the whole problem.

Here's the question that animates this whole piece, and the one nobody in the industry asks out loud: **why can a travel agent in Manila sell a ticket on an airline she's never spoken to, get paid her commission automatically, and never once chase the airline for the money — while an education agent two floors up still emails a spreadsheet to a school in Melbourne and waits eight weeks for a wire?** Same year, same building, same kind of agent. Two completely different infrastructures underneath. One industry built the plumbing. The other built the storefront and called it a day.

This is a long one, because it's the pillar that explains a dozen smaller frustrations — late commissions, reconciliation hell, why the all-in-one CRM never quite closes the loop, why aggregators feel inevitable. They all trace back to one absence. Let me name it.

## The two systems travel built, and why everyone only copies one

When people say "travel has a GDS," they're usually pointing at the wrong half of the magic. So let's be precise, because the precision *is* the argument.

A **GDS — Global Distribution System** (Amadeus, Sabre, Travelport) is the booking layer. It's the screen the travel agent searches: live availability, fares and schedules across hundreds of airlines, with a button that reserves the seat. It answers one question — *what's available and how do I book it?* It is, essentially, a shared inventory window onto a thousand suppliers at once.

The **BSP — Billing and Settlement Plan**, run by IATA since 1971, is the layer underneath, and it's the one almost nobody in international education has heard of. **The BSP is a neutral clearinghouse: agents report all their sales into one system, pay a single consolidated amount to a clearing bank each week, and the bank distributes the money to every airline and pays each agent's commission back out.** No agent chases 400 airlines. No airline chases 59,000 agents. One pipe, one reconciliation, settled centrally. The numbers are almost comical next to ours: IATA's BSP operates in 207+ countries, serves over 400 airlines and tens of thousands of agents, processed over $240 billion in 2023, and runs at a 99.999% on-time settlement rate.

Read that last sentence again with an education agent's eyes. **A neutral body settles a quarter-trillion dollars a year between strangers, almost perfectly, and it has done so since before most of us were born.**

Now hold it against our industry. The most-cited figure on agent payment operations is bleak: only about 19% of agents receive commission through third-party software, while roughly 40% run on in-house manual processes — spreadsheets, in other words, with no system at all. There is no clearinghouse. There is no shared weekly settlement. There is no neutral middle party that adds up what every agent is owed, subtracts what every school must pay, and moves the difference automatically. **International education copied the GDS — the storefront — and never built the BSP — the bank.**

## The four-layer stack: where the industry actually stopped

To see exactly where the industry stalled, it helps to break "a GDS system for education" into the four layers it actually contains. I'll call it the **distribution stack**, top to bottom:

| Layer | What it does | Travel's version | International education's version |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Quoting | Price a course/package for a student | Fare display | Edvisor, EducationLink, agency CRMs — **built** |
| 2. Inventory | Show what's available across many suppliers | GDS availability | ApplyBoard, Adventus course search — **partly built** |
| 3. Booking | Reserve the place, route the application | GDS booking / PNR | Aggregator portals, school application systems — **partly built** |
| 4. Settlement | Move and net the money, pay commissions | BSP clearinghouse | — **never built** |

*"—" = no industry-wide equivalent exists. Verified June 2026; this is a map of layers, not a vendor scorecard.*

The pattern is the whole story. **Every layer that touches information got built. The one layer that touches money did not.** Quoting is arithmetic and a nice UI. Inventory is a database of courses. Booking is a form and a status field. All three are software problems, and software problems get solved by SaaS companies chasing subscriptions — which is exactly what happened, repeatedly. Settlement is not a software problem. Settlement is a *trust and money-movement* problem: it requires a neutral party that thousands of competing schools and thousands of competing agents will all let hold and route their cash. That is a different kind of hard, and SaaS economics don't reward solving it.

The part of this you already feel every day lives entirely in layer 4. Your [agency management system records the money but never moves it](/blog/education-agency-management-system-payments-gap.md) — it's a layers 1-to-3 tool with a money-shaped hole where the actual cash should flow. That's not a flaw in the software. It's the edge of what that kind of software was ever built to do.

## What Edvisor, Book&Learn and my own company actually built (and didn't)

I'm implicated in this, so let me be specific rather than diplomatic.

The 2020 wave of consolidation in agent software was real and rational. In February 2020, [Edvisor](/compare/edvisor.md) merged with Book&Learn to become, by their own description, the world's largest agency-and-school network — over 7,500 agency users and 1,500 schools across fifty-odd countries, including the lion's share of Latin American agencies. In November 2020 the same company acquired [EducationLink](/compare/educationlink.md) — my company — adding the Australian agency base. On paper this looked like the industry finally assembling its GDS: one network, schools on one side, agents on the other, a single channel between them.

But look at what was being consolidated: **layers 1 through 3.** Quoting engines, course catalogues, application routing, agreement management. The merged entity got enormously better at *telling you what a student owed and what you were owed.* What none of it did — what mine didn't do, and I designed it — was **collect the student's money, take out the school's cut and the agent's commission, and pay each side automatically.** We built an immaculate ledger. The money still crawled out through your own bank account, lost a slice to the exchange rate on the way, and waited on the school's own payment cycle. The records were perfect. Moving the money was still a wire transfer and a prayer.

This is the part founders don't like to say: **we consolidated the booking layer because it was the layer we knew how to build and sell.** A clearinghouse would have required us to become a regulated money-movement business that competing schools trusted to sit on tuition. That's not a feature you ship in a sprint. So the whole industry, my own company included, kept shipping better storefronts and left the bank unbuilt.

## ApplyBoard didn't become a GDS. It became Booking.com

The other thing that happened is that someone *did* go big on layers 2 and 3 — and the model they reached for tells you why settlement still didn't get built.

[ApplyBoard](/blog/education-agent-aggregator-vs-direct-school-agreements.md) and Adventus are usually described as "the GDS of international education," but that's not quite what they are. A GDS is neutral infrastructure: it doesn't own the customer, it charges suppliers a fee to be discoverable, and the agent's relationship is with the airline. **ApplyBoard's model is the opposite — it's the Booking.com model.** It aggregates institutions, recruits a network of agents (technically sub-agents), routes students, and takes a slice of the commission the school was always going to pay. It owns the channel. That's a marketplace/OTA, not neutral plumbing.

The distinction matters enormously for the money. A neutral clearinghouse *wants* to be boring, shared, and owned by no one — that's what makes everyone willing to send money through it. A marketplace *wants* to own the customer and hold the money a while, because that's how it earns. **You can't be the neutral money system and the channel-owning marketplace at the same time; the second goal kills the first.** So the most successful platforms in our industry are the *least* likely to ever become the shared payment system, because their business depends on keeping a slice and controlling the timing — the exact frictions a clearinghouse exists to remove. Booking.com never became the bank for hotels. Why would ApplyBoard become it for schools?

Now the strongest objection to everything I've just said, because it deserves a real answer and not a strawman: **maybe the aggregator outcome isn't a failure at all — maybe it's exactly what should have happened.** The case goes like this. Aviation's BSP works because a plane seat is the same product everywhere, with one global body the airlines themselves own and fund; a shared payment system is cheap to run when every sale is identical. Education is the opposite — every course is different, enrolments run for years, refunds are constant, money crosses borders, and every school agreement has its own terms. In a market that messy, the effort of getting everyone onto one shared system may simply cost more than it's worth, and the *right* answer may be exactly what emerged: big platforms that own the channel, do the matching, carry the risk and handle the money themselves, and get paid for absorbing all of it. On this view Booking.com didn't "fail" to become a bank for hotels — a marketplace that also acted as everyone's bank would have been worse for everyone, and the market was right not to build it. The job got done where the money was actually there to pay for it. The missing money layer didn't vanish; it got swallowed into the marketplace because that's where it was cheapest to run.

That objection is half right, and the half it gets wrong is the half that matters. It's true that a single, industry-wide, one-size payment system is probably not coming and probably shouldn't — the messiness is real. But "the marketplace swallowed the money problem" only describes what happened *inside* the aggregator's own network, not across the industry. The agent who holds her own agreements with thirty schools got *nothing* from ApplyBoard solving it — she's not in ApplyBoard's system. The "it's efficient" story quietly assumes everyone goes through the marketplace. Most student placements don't. So the gap isn't really solved — it's solved *inside the marketplaces and missing everywhere else*, which is exactly the hole a neutral money tool — one that works for any agent, no matter whose schools they use — exists to fill, without forcing anyone to join a marketplace. The marketplace fixed the money for the people it owns. Everyone else still wires money and prays.

## Why settlement specifically keeps failing: six structural reasons

If the missing layer were merely unbuilt for lack of effort, someone with enough money would have built it by now. People have tried. It keeps failing for reasons that are structural, not accidental.

**There's no IATA.** Aviation had a single, powerful, airline-owned body that could *force* everyone to take part — you don't get to sell tickets at scale without being in the BSP. International education has nothing that can do that. No one can make a university in Manchester and a language school in Malta use the same payment system. Without that pressure, a clearinghouse is just one more optional supplier in a crowded market — and an optional shared system isn't shared, because it only works when everyone's in.

**Schools don't want clean per-enrollment commission — partly for good reasons, partly for leverage.** This is the reason most people miss, and it's the most important one, so let me be fair about it before I'm pointed. An airline pays BSP a defined cut per ticket, automatically, the moment the sale settles — clean, metered, non-negotiable. Schools want the opposite, and *some of why they want it is legitimate.* Commission isn't paid when a student enrolls; it's paid after the **census date** — the day enrolment becomes financially binding — because before census the enrolment isn't earned revenue. The student can accept, get a CoE, even arrive, and still withdraw, which can trigger a refund the school has to fund under tuition-protection rules. Paying commission at enrolment would mean paying out on tuition the school hasn't earned and might have to give back. **Clawbacks and progression conditions exist for the same defensible reason:** tie the payout to the student actually studying and you stop rewarding agents who recruit a warm body, collect, and don't care if the student vanishes — exactly the behaviour Australia's 2025 [agent-integrity reforms](/blog/marketing-budget-education-agent-commission-australia.md) are trying to stamp out. None of that is cynical. It's revenue recognition, fraud control and compliance.

But here's the pointed half, and an honest school will admit it: **the same ambiguity that protects the school also happens to be leverage, and that's why no one's in a hurry to remove it.** As anyone who has negotiated a school agreement knows, the lack of clarity Flywire documents — "a lack of clarity around how many/which students... and at what point" commission is owed — lets the school control the timing, the trigger and the size of every payout, well past what fraud control strictly requires. The legitimate reasons set a floor; discretion does the rest. A neutral payment system that built in the census-date timing and the clawback rules *could* respect the genuine reasons and still remove the extra wiggle room — but the side holding the cash has little reason to build the very thing that takes away its own wiggle room. So the school, the one that *could* have pushed for a shared system the way airlines did, has just enough honest cover to keep quietly preferring things as they are. And notice the mismatch the airline comparison exposes: airlines built the BSP because *they* were the ones drowning in chasing money. In education it's the opposite — the school pays, it doesn't collect, and the agent is the one waiting eight weeks for the wire. So the party with the power to build the system is the party that already finds the current setup perfectly comfortable.

**Every transaction is bespoke.** An airline ticket is a near-commodity with standardised fare rules. An education placement is a tangle of variable commission percentages, [gross-versus-net definitions, scholarship carve-outs and sub-agent splits](/blog/how-education-agent-commissions-work.md) that differ for *every school and often every agreement.* Standardised settlement needs standardised transactions. Ours resist standardisation by their nature, which is precisely why [40% of agents are still doing it by hand](/blog/should-small-education-agencies-invest-in-crm-payment-systems.md).

**Currency and refunds make it harder than airlines ever had it.** Travel settlement mostly stays inside one country's currency. Education money crosses borders by definition — reais to Australian dollars, rupees to pounds — losing a slice to [the exchange-rate markup that quietly eats your margin](/blog/hidden-costs-international-payments-education.md) every time, and it reverses constantly through [refunds that follow at least five different paths](/blog/international-student-refunds-five-flows.md). A shared system that has to handle many currencies at once *and* unwind refunds is a far harder machine than the one IATA built.

**Agents won't give a shared system a percentage either.** Here's the matching problem on the other side. A clearinghouse has to get paid somehow, and the obvious way — the one aggregators already use — is to take a slice of the commission passing through it. But agents have spent years watching [aggregators take exactly that slice](/blog/education-agent-aggregator-vs-direct-school-agreements.md), and they're done handing over percentages of money they see as theirs. **Ask an agent to send their hard-won commission through a system that skims a few points and they hear "another middleman," not "shared plumbing everyone benefits from."** So you've got a money layer that schools won't pay for because it takes away their control, and that agents won't pay for because it taxes their cut — and a shared system only works when everyone's in. **The layer doesn't exist because both sides of the deal have a reason to stay out of it.** That's not a technology gap. It's a stand-off where both sides' interests point away from the one thing that would fix it — which is exactly why a shared system, if it's ever built, can't be paid for by taking a percentage of anyone's commission.

**The money chased the storefront, not the plumbing.** The investment that poured into this industry chased flashy growth numbers — students placed, schools signed, agents added — the kind of figures a marketplace produces and a quiet payment utility doesn't. Building a boring, neutral, low-cost payment system is the opposite of an exciting growth story. So the money built more Booking.coms, because that's what the money was chasing.

## How AI changes the math — the good and the genuinely bad

The honest reason settlement never got built is partly that the bespoke-transaction problem made reconciliation impossibly labour-intensive at scale. AI changes that calculus, in both directions.

**The good:** the thing that killed every previous attempt — reconciling thousands of different agreements, matching payments to enrolments, working out split commissions across sub-agents — is exactly the kind of messy, high-volume matching that AI now does cheaply. For the first time you can take a chaos of one-off agreements and turn it into something a payment system can actually process, without hiring an army of clerks. The big objection — "every deal is different" — gets much weaker the moment software can read and reconcile every different deal at almost no cost. AI doesn't build the shared system, but it removes the single biggest reason building one never paid off. And on the money-movement side, a new rail has finally appeared cheap and fast enough to matter: [stablecoins, used as an invisible back-end pipe rather than a coin anyone holds](/blog/stablecoins-international-education-payments.md), which is how the cost of the missing layer finally starts to come down.

**The bad, and don't skip this part:** the same power that lets a neutral system reconcile at scale also lets a marketplace tighten its grip. AI makes it cheaper for aggregators to run ever-bigger sub-agent networks and to work out exactly how long they can hold onto your money before you complain. And it lowers the cost of the very thing a clearinghouse exists to stop: **commission fraud — duplicate claims, fake enrolments, made-up sign-ups — gets easier to do at volume.** The whole disciplinary value of the BSP is that one shared system makes fraud visible, because everything checks against a single set of records. Pour AI into a *scattered* landscape with no shared system and you don't get less fraud — you get more of it, faster. AI is an accelerant. Whether it speeds us toward a shared system or toward deeper marketplace control depends entirely on who builds with it first.

## What this means if you're an agent or a school right now

You are not going to wake up to an industry-wide shared system next quarter. No one can force it into being, and the big players large enough to build it have businesses that depend on it not existing. So the realistic move isn't to wait for it — it's to stop running your own payments by hand while it doesn't exist. And be precise about what you're buying in the meantime: the well-known cross-border platforms solve the one-payment-across-a-border half, and [the recurring-collection half is a different job entirely](/blog/flywire-convera-transfermate-vs-tuition-billing-platforms.md) — buying the first doesn't get you the second.

Concretely: the cost you're carrying isn't vague. It's the slice the exchange rate takes out of every cross-border tuition payment, the weeks your commission sits in someone else's account before it reaches you, the hours your team burns matching payments to enrolments, and the [duplicate or missing payments](/blog/student-payments-direct-debit-good-bad-ugly-australia.md) a shared system would have caught automatically. Every one of those is a tax you pay *because* the money layer was never built.

Put a number on it, because "missing layer" stays abstract until it's real money. Take one student paying AUD 12,000 of tuition from Brazil into an Australian college. Move that through a typical bank or card payment and the markup hidden *inside the exchange rate* — the part that never shows up on any invoice — commonly runs **2.5–4%**, so call it roughly AUD 300–480 gone on a single payment, before the fixed transfer fee on the way in and the second fee when your commission is paid back out. A flat fee per payment, by contrast, is a set figure measured in tens of dollars — not a percentage of the tuition. Run that across a few hundred students a year and the gap between "a cut on every payment" and "a flat fee per payment" is the difference between a leak you can't see and a cost you can plan for. *(Those percentages are rough market figures — the hidden cost varies by country, bank and card type; run it on your own numbers and your own provider's rate, which is exactly the point.)*

That's the gap Qualy is built to close — not by becoming another marketplace that owns your channel, but by being the money layer your CRM and your aggregator never were: collecting tuition from students, paying schools, and handling [agent and sub-agent commissions](/features/master-and-sub-agent-payments.md) on a **flat fee instead of a percentage cut**. That last point isn't a marketing line — it's the direct answer to why a shared system never got built: agents won't send their commission through anything that takes a percentage, so the only money layer they'll actually accept is one that doesn't. And it gets around the stand-off this whole article describes: because it works for the agent first, **you don't have to wait for all your schools to sign up too.** The reason an industry-wide system never appeared is that it needs everyone in at once; a money tool you can start using on your own — collecting your students' tuition and paying your sub-agents through it from day one, on the same countries you already work with — doesn't. It isn't an industry-wide clearinghouse; no one can build that alone. But it's the missing piece, usable by a single agency without anyone's permission, mandate, or sign-off. We're a payments company telling you this piece is missing — so take our enthusiasm with a pinch of salt, then go work out what the missing piece is actually costing you.

The industry built the storefront beautifully and three times over. It still hasn't built the bank. Until someone with the mandate does, the gap is yours to close one corridor at a time — and at least now you know what to call the thing that's missing.

## Sources

- [IATA — Billing and Settlement Plan (BSP)](https://www.iata.org/en/services/finance/bsp/): the official description of the clearinghouse model, scale and on-time settlement rate.
- [AltexSoft — IATA's BSP explained](https://www.altexsoft.com/blog/iata-bsp/): history (first BSP 1971), payment-flow mechanics, agent–airline settlement, $240B+ processed in 2023.
- [The PIE News — Edvisor and Book&Learn announce merger](https://thepienews.com/edvisor-book-learn-agent-merger/): February 2020 merger, 7,500+ agency users and 1,500 schools, "world's largest network" claim.
- [The PIE News — Edvisor expands network with EducationLink acquisition](https://thepienews.com/edvisor-expands-agency-network-with-educationlink-acquisition/): November 2020 acquisition of EducationLink, Australian agency base.
- [ICEF Monitor — managing student payments from an agent's perspective](https://monitor.icef.com/2021/12/managing-student-payments-from-an-agents-perspective/): the 19% third-party-software / 40% manual-process figures and the duplicated/missing-payment failure modes.
- [ICEF Monitor — agent aggregators and channel consolidation](https://monitor.icef.com/2022/11/building-to-scale-are-agent-aggregators-changing-the-dynamics-of-international-student-recruitment/): aggregator models, agent-network scale for ApplyBoard and Adventus.
- [Flywire — acquisition of Cohort Go](https://www.flywire.com/news/flywire-announces-acquisition-of-cohort-go-to-accelerate-growth-with-international-education-agents): July 2022, education payments handled one country-to-country route at a time — point-to-point processing, not one shared system that settles everyone at once.
- [Flywire — International Education Agents 101](https://www.flywire.com/resources/international-education-agents-101): commission "usually upon placement and based on a percentage of first-year tuition," and the documented lack of clarity over which students and at what stage commission is owed — the basis for the per-enrollment ambiguity argument.

## Frequently asked questions

### Does international education have a GDS like travel does?

Partly. It has the booking and course-search part — Edvisor and EducationLink for quoting, ApplyBoard and Adventus for finding courses and routing applications. What it never built is the part that sits underneath a travel GDS: a neutral, shared system like aviation's BSP that actually collects and pays out the money. International education copied the storefront, not the bank.

### What is IATA's BSP and why does it matter to education?

The Billing and Settlement Plan is aviation's neutral clearinghouse, running since 1971. Agents report all sales into one system, pay a single consolidated amount weekly, and a clearing bank distributes funds to airlines and pays agent commissions. It settles $240B+ a year at 99.999% on-time. It's the exact piece of infrastructure international education never built for tuition and commissions.

### Why doesn't international education just build a shared payment system?

Six reasons: there is no body, like aviation's IATA, that can make everyone take part; schools resist paying commission cleanly per enrolment, partly for good reasons (the money isn't earned until after census and may be refunded) and partly because the vagueness is useful leverage; agents refuse to give any shared system a percentage of their commission after years of aggregators taking a cut; every school agreement has different terms; money crossing borders plus constant refunds make it far harder than aviation; and investors funded flashy marketplaces, not boring payment plumbing.

### Why don't schools and agents want a per-enrolment payment system?

Both sides resist it, for opposite reasons. Schools pay commission after the census date, not when a student enrols, for real reasons — before census the tuition isn't earned and may be refunded — but the same control over timing, conditions and clawbacks also works as leverage they're slow to give up. Agents, on the other side, won't hand a shared system a percentage of their commission after watching aggregators take a slice for years. A shared system only works when everyone's in, and both sides have a reason to stay out.

### Is ApplyBoard the GDS of international education?

Not quite. A true GDS is neutral infrastructure that doesn't own the customer. ApplyBoard is closer to Booking.com — it owns the channel, signs up sub-agents, and takes a slice of commission. That's a marketplace, not a neutral shared system, and its business depends on keeping a cut and controlling when you get paid — the opposite of what a neutral payment system needs to do.

### Don't payment companies like Flywire already solve this?

They solve part of it. Flywire (which bought Cohort Go in 2022) and similar companies move tuition and handle commissions one country-to-country route at a time, between a single payer and a single payee. That's genuinely useful, but it isn't one shared system that settles all schools and all agents together. The money layer exists in scattered pieces, not as one thing everyone plugs into.

### How will AI change the missing money layer?

Both ways. AI can finally read thousands of different agreements and match payments to enrolments cheaply, removing the biggest reason a shared system never paid off. But the same power lets aggregators tighten their grip and lets bad actors fake commission claims at scale. One shared system makes fraud visible because everything checks against the same records; without one, AI just speeds up a scattered system in whatever direction whoever builds first decides.

### What can an agency do today while no industry-wide system exists?

Stop running payments by hand. The cost of the missing piece is concrete: the cut the exchange rate takes on every cross-border payment, the weeks your commission sits before it reaches you, the hours spent matching payments to enrolments, and duplicate or missing payments. Use a payment tool that actually collects tuition, pays schools and handles sub-agent commissions — ideally on a flat fee, not a percentage — instead of waiting for an industry-wide system no single company can force into being.

## Related articles

- [Does your education agency management system actually move money? The records-vs-payments gap](/blog/education-agency-management-system-payments-gap.md)
- [Aggregator vs direct school agreements: what the channel actually costs an education agent](/blog/education-agent-aggregator-vs-direct-school-agreements.md)
- [How education agent commissions work: rates, gross vs net, and getting paid on time](/blog/how-education-agent-commissions-work.md)

## More on Qualy

**Industries**

- [For schools](/international-education/for-schools.md) — For international education schools
- [For agents](/international-education/for-education-agents.md) — For international education agents

**Support**

- [Training](/training.md)
- [System status](https://qualyhq.statuspage.io/) — Qualy system status
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- [Contact](/contact-us.md)

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- [Testimonials](/testimonials.md) — Learn what some customers have to say about Qualy
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- [Blog](/blog) — International education payments blog by Qualy
- [Trust center](/trust.md)
- [API](/api.md) — Qualy API for international education payments
- [Zapier](/zapier.md) — Connect Qualy to 7,000+ apps with Zapier
- [NexPay](/nexpay.md) — Qualy + NexPay — automate everything around the payment

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